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The goal of this paper is to analyze the relationship between defense expenditures 
and economic growth in Romania, trying to find out the existence, direction and 
intensity of this connection. The methods which I used are cluster analysis, quintile 
analysis, regression technique and Granger causality. The results suggest that in 
Romania there is a negative correlation. A potential cause of the negative effect of 
defense expenditures on economic growth in Romania is the high proportion of the 
spending on equipment and other operational spending. Also I have considered the 
implications of the budgetary restriction – the limited resources might be given priority 
for other programs.  
Keywords:  fiscal policy, public expenditures, defense expenditures, economic 
growth, budget constraint
JEL Classification: E62, H41, H56, H6
Research questions: 
Is defense expenditure related to economic growth? 
If it is, what are the sign and direction of the correlation between defense expenditure 
and economic growth?  
Does the structure of defense expenditure matter? 
1. Introduction 
For policy purposes, it is very important to determine the channels by which defense 
expenditures influence the economic growth process. For the policy makers, the 
impact of defense expenditures on economic development, which can be positive or 
negative, can have different implications with respect to what strategy to apply to 
stimulate economic growth.
A positive relationship between defense expenditures and growth (“guns and butter”) 
and the direction of causation that runs from defense expenditures to economic 
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growth implies that defense expenditures stimulate economic growth. This relationship 
may be explained, especially in the less developed countries, by the fact that defense 
expenditures have benefic effects on economic growth, by engaging in research and 
development, providing technical skills, educational training and generating an 
infrastructure necessary for economic development. 
A negative relationship between defense expenditures and growth (“guns or butter”) 
and the direction of causation that runs from defense expenditures to economic 
growth implies that defense expenditures crowd-out private investment, by distorting 
resource allocation and diverting resources from productive activities. 
The goal of this paper is to analyze the relationship between defense expenditures 
and economic growth in Romania, trying to find out the existence, direction and 
intensity of this connection. 
The paper is structured as follows: in the second section which contains the 
theoretical background for the impact of defense expenditure on economic growth, I 
deliver the possible explanations for defense expenditures and I analyze the 
arguments that sustain a positive/negative correlation between defense expenditures 
and economic growth. The third section contains a listing of the empirical studies that 
sustain a positive/negative/no correlation between defense expenditures and 
economic growth. There are also tests of this correlation for Romania in the period 
1990-2007, using quintile analysis, regression technique and Granger causality. The 
last section concludes. 
2. The impact of defense expenditure on economic 
growth – Theoretical background 
There is a large literature on this issue, but the most frequently approaches are in the 
context of “guns or butter” vs. “guns and butter”. The impact of defense expenditure 
on growth might be dependent on the threats posed by foreign countries and other 
external forces – threats without defense expenditure would reduce growth, defense 
expenditure without threats would reduce growth, while defense expenditure in the 
presence of sufficiently large threats increases growth. 
What causes a country’s investment in defense expenditures to vary? What are the 
motivations behind a state’s decision to raise spending on defense? If a state decides 
to raise defense expenditure, there will be an impact on economic growth? 
These issues are addressed in the context of a state’s broader foreign policy goals, 
and the explanation of the defense expenditures is based on the following 
hypotheses
2:
x  Hypothesis 1 (Ambition) - states are ambitious and economic growth produces 
forward-looking foreign policies and thus greater military expenditures; as a 
consequence, a state’s military spending varies with its economic power 
Ambition hypothesis contends that military expenditures are both directly and 
indirectly a positive function of economic growth; it is based on five assumptions about 
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international politics: (a) the international system lacks a central authority to arbitrate 
disputes among states; (b) states cannot discern the intensions of other states with 
any amount of certainty; (c) all states possess some form of military capabilities giving 
them the ability to inflict harm on their neighbors; (d) the pursuit of additional economic 
and military power represents the highest goal of states; (e) a state’s wealth shapes 
its foreign policy objectives. 
x  Hypothesis 2 (Fear) - states are fearful and they increase their military 
expenditures in response to threats 
Fear hypothesis contends that military expenditures are a function of a state’s 
insecurity. It is based on the following assumptions: (a) the international system lacks 
a central authority to arbitrate disputes among states; (b) states cannot discern the 
intensions of other states with any amount of certainty; (c) all states possess some 
form of military capabilities giving them the ability to inflict harm on their neighbors; (d) 
a state’s foreign policy is not driven by the lust for power, but instead is motivated by a 
search for survival 
In order to determine whether their neighbors are threatening, states look at the 
following indicators
3: the aggregate economic and military capabilities of other states, 
geography, the threat-defense balance, perception of aggressive intentions. 
x  Hypothesis 3 (Legitimacy) - states use aggressive foreign policies and high levels 
of military expenditures to deflect domestic troubles 
Legitimacy hypothesis contends that government leaders use foreign policy to deflect 
problems at home; when governments perceive a potential loss to their legitimacy, 
they will implement an expansionist foreign policy and increase military expenditures. 
It is based on the following assumptions: (a) the foremost goal of governments is 
maintaining their political power; (b) a state’s interest group attempt to alter foreign 
policy to their advantage; (c) policymakers consider both domestic and international 
threats to their security when deciding on an appropriate foreign policy. 
In order to determine the important channels through which public revenues and 
expenditures, including defense expenditures, may affect economic growth, we 
consider the production function: 
  t t t t t L B , K A F Y     , where: Kt =capital, Lt =labor, At = technical progress, 
measuring the quality of capital, Bt = function (of educational level, health, nutrition, 
security), measuring the quality of labor. 
The channels of influencing the economic growth consist of policies that increase 
capital per labor, increase the productivity (quality) of capital and labor. In order to 
stimulate the economic growth by means of the fiscal policy, the state has more 
instruments
4: (a) financing of direct investments, which the private sector would not 
provide in adequate quantities;  (b) efficient supply of certain public services which are 
necessary to ensure the basic conditions to display the economic activity and the 
long-term investments; (c) financing of public activities so as to minimize the 
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distortions to come up with the decisions to spend and invest properly in the private 
sector.   
The channels of fiscal policy’s influence on economic growth are: increase the labor’s 
productivity (state invest in capital and labor only when it completes private sector’s 
activities, situation that is necessary because of the externality or market 
imperfections), increase the capital’s productivity (state might offer social and 
economic infrastructure that facilitate private sector’s activity), increase the quantity of 
labor and capital factors (state might finance the public activities in a way that 
minimize the possible distortions over the demand or supply of capital and labor).
Theoretical background offers arguments for both positive and negative relationship 
between defense expenditures and economic growth. Arguments that sustain a 
positive correlation between defense expenditures and economic growth (“guns and 
butter” approach) are:
x Research and development in the defense sector 
Research and developments in defense sector may have positive effects through 
externalities on the civilian part of economy. Defense spending may create social 
infrastructure and other forms of public goods. Military research and defense 
expenditures may also create technological innovations with broader applicability, 
enhancing economic growth. 
In the less developing countries, military may help in creating a socioeconomic 
structure conducive to growth
5; military may engage in research and development, 
provide technical skills, educational training and create an infrastructure necessary for 
economic development. 
x Security 
Defense spending can generate economic benefits because it provides security which 
promotes a stable business environment, a necessary condition for encouraging 
foreign investment.  It also enforces the property rights and market dynamics that 
produce growth in a global capitalist system. 
Considering that defense expenditures increase security, it may stimulate economic 
growth. Adam Smith noted that the first two duties of the state were ‘that of protecting 
the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies….that of 
protecting, as far as possible, every member of society from the injustice or 
oppression of every member of it’. In many poor countries, war, corruption
6 and lack of 
security are major obstacles to development. 
x  Demand
The effect is positive through an expansion of aggregate demand (Keynesian effect), 
the increased demand leads to an increase of utilization of the idle capital, higher 
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employment and profits, therefore higher investment, all of which causing economic 
growth.
Defense expenditure may be considered a tool of fiscal policy and can therefore be 
increased to stimulate demand or decreased to dampen demand. This impact 
depends on the multiplier effect, assuming there is not a corresponding increase in 
taxation to finance the spending and the extent of crowding out caused by the 
spending.
x  Labor
Defense spending may increase the skill set of the population through training and 
education of military personnel. It has a growth-stimulating effect if it moves the 
economy closer to full employment, creates human capital, promotes stability, and 
provides infrastructure. 
It is often argued that expenditure on defense training in developing countries may 
contribute to improving the educational level of the labor force and may act as a 
stabilizing influence in the society. 
x  Investment  
Capital expenditure can have productive uses: private sector benefits from the 
transport networks that are originally constructed for military purposes. Investment in 
the defense sector generates positive externalities for the civilian sector, like public 
infrastructure development, technology spillovers and human capital formation. 
Arguments that sustain a negative correlation between defense expenditures and 
economic growth (“guns or butter” approach) are:
x Crowding out effect 
Military spending can have an adverse effect on economic growth by crowding-out 
private investment - higher defense spending generates a distortion in resource 
allocation and the diversion of resources from productive activities to the accumulation 
of armaments and the maintenance of military forces. 
The International Monetary Fund
7  claims that, in general, military spending may 
reduce resources available for investment in “productive capital, education, and 
market-oriented technological innovation.” In this context, military expenditures may 
adversely affect investments, savings, human capital, infrastructure programs. The 
extent and form of crowding out of an increase in defense spending will depend on 
prior utilization and how the increase is financed. 
x Opportunity cost  
Trying to explain the negative correlation between military expenditure and growth, 
economists focus on the opportunity cost of defense spending, military expenditures 
hinder economic development by reducing savings and misallocating resources away 
from more productive use in the public or private sector. In the same context, R&D in 
the defense sector may divert R&D from the private sector where it may receive more 
practical application.
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Government expenditures on national defense carry an opportunity cost, because of 
lowering economic output and slowing rates of GDP growth. The International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank suggest that resources spent on preparation for 
war and on war-fighting could be better employed elsewhere. This argument is 
considered stronger in the case of the less developed countries. 
x Increased taxation 
The government budget constraint requires that an increase in defense expenditure 
might be financed by cuts in other public expenditure, increased taxes, increased 
borrowing or expansion in the money supply
8. The way the increase in defense 
expenditure is financed will have further effects, which feeds back on the economy.
Defense expenditure, if financed by non-distorting revenues, has a positive effect on 
economic growth; if financed by distorting revenues, it might have a positive or nega-
tive effect on economic growth, depending on the level of the defense expenditure.
x Efficiency of resource allocation 
Another channel by which defense expenditures may affect the economic growth is 
through their direct impact on the efficiency of resource allocation. Military spending is 
not governed by market processes, so it tends to create distortions in relative prices. 
Policies implemented to support a military program might be detrimental to efficient 
resource allocation and economic growth.
x Increased political power of the military 
Defense expenditure may be driven not by security needs, but by a rent seeking 
military industrial complex, and may cause arms races or damaging war. Many of 
these effects are contingent, depending on the degree of utilization, the externalities 
from defense spending and the effectiveness in countering the threat.
3. The impact of defense expenditure on economic 
growth – Empirical studies 
There is a large literature containing empirical studies that analyze the correlation 
between defense expenditures and economic growth; their conclusions are sensitive 
to the database and the method used to measure this effect. 
The following studies conclude that there is a positive correlation between public 
defense and economic growth: 
x  Benoit (1978) analyzed the correlation for 44 less developed countries over the 
period 1950-1965 and concluded that defense spending may stimulate aggregate 
demand leading to economic growth;
x  Babin (1986) used data from 88 developing countries from 1965 to 1981; he 
found a consistently positive relationship and concluded that military stability is an 
important precondition for economic advancement;
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x  Atesoglu and Mueller (1990) used a two sector Feder-Ram model for the US over 
the period 1949 to 1989. They found a positive effect from the defense sector to 
the civilian sector;
x  Stewart (1991) applied a Keynesian demand function to a group of less 
developed countries. He founds that both defense and non-defense expenditure 
have positive effects on growth, but the effect of non-defense spending is 
stronger;
x Ward, Davis, Penubarti, Rajmaira and Cochran (1991) used a three sector 
Feder-Ram model with separate externality and productivity effects for India over 
the period 1950 to 1987. Defense expenditure was found to have a positive effect 
on growth.
x Mueller and Atesoglu (1993) incorporated technological change into a two sector 
Feder-Ram model using US data for the period 1948 to 1990. They found a 
significant relationship from defense to growth.
x  Ando (2008) used data from 109 countries, including 30 OECD countries, over the 
period 1995-2003. The result showed that defense expenditures has a positive 
impact on the rate of economic growth; the military sector goes up positively, so 
does economic growth;
x  Bose, Haque, Osborn (2003) for a panel of thirty developing countries over the 
period 1970-1990, suggested a positive and significant association between 
defense spending and growth. 
The following studies conclude that there is a negative correlation between public 
defense and economic growth: 
x  Mintz and Huang (1990) using a three equation model for the US found that 
defense expenditure negatively impacts on investment and, therefore, growth; 
x  Scheetz (1991) used pooled cross-section time series data for four Latin 
American countries over the period 1969 to 1987. He found defense expenditure 
has a negative effect on investment; 
x  Ward and Davis (1992) used a three sector Feder-Ram model for the US over the 
period 1948 to 1990. They separated the effects of defense spending into 
productivity and externality effects. They found defense spending has a negative 
effect on economic growth, with a negative productivity effect but a positive 
externality effect; 
x  Sezghin, Yildirim (2002) used data from Turkey, over the period 1951-1998. They 
found  that the share of military spending in Turkey decreases as the growth rate 
increases in the long-run; 
x  Galvin (2003) used 2SLS and 3SLS to estimate a demand- and supply-side 
model for 64 less developed countries using cross-section data. He concluded 
that defense spending has negative effects for both economic growth and the 
savings-income ratio; 
x  Guaresma, Reitschuler (2003) found that the partial correlation between defense 
spending and economic growth appears robust and significantly negative only for 
countries with a relatively low military expenditure ratio;  The Impact of Defense Expenditure on Economic Growth 
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x  Kentor, Kick (2008) explored a new dimension of military spending, military 
expenditures per soldier, which captures the capital intensiveness of a country’s 
military organization. The cross-national panel regression and causal analyses of 
developed and less developed countries from 1990 to 2003 showed that military 
expenditures per soldier inhibit the growth of per capita GDP, with the most 
pronounced effects in least developed countries;
x  Abu-Bader, Abu-Quarn (2003) investigated the causal relationship between 
government expenditures and economic growth for Egypt, Israel, Syria for the 
past three decades; they found that the share of military expenditures in GDP 
negatively affects economic growth. 
The following studies conclude that there might be a positive and also a negative 
correlation between public defense and economic growth: 
x  Chowdhury (1991) undertaken Granger causality testing using defense burden 
time series for 55 less developed countries. He found positive causality from 
defense to growth for seven countries, negative causality for 15 countries, no 
causality for 30 countries and bi-directional causality for three countries; 
Guaresma, Reitschuler (2003) used data from 105 developed and developing coun-
tries, for the period 1960-1990.They found evidence of a robust negative partial 
correlation between military expenditures and growth for countries with relatively low 
levels of defense expenditure share. Using a dataset that includes more recent 
observations, they found additional evidence for a level-dependent effect of defense 
spending on growth and were also able to explain the sources of the negative growth 
effect of military expenditures on growth for the subsample of countries with a low 
military burden - the negative productivity differential between the military and civilian 
sector;  
Wilkins (2004) estimated pooled model explaining GDP growth as a function of labor, 
capital and defense, for 85 countries over the period 1988-2002. The defense variable 
is positive and significant for 39 countries, negative and significant for eight countries 
and insignificant for the remaining 38 countries. While a minority of countries do have 
a negative coefficient, for the most part it can be concluded that defense has a 
positive coefficient within the growth framework considered here and therefore would 
not be considered to have a detrimental effect on growth.
The following studies conclude that there is no correlation between public defense 
and economic growth: 
x  Benoit (1973), studying 44 developing countries, found not evidence that defense 
spending has an adverse effect on growth; 
x  Alexander (1990) used a four sector Feder-Ram model for nine developed 
countries over the period 1974 to 1985 using cross section time series data. He 
found no effect of defense spending on economic growth; 
x  Huang and Mintz (1990) estimated a three sector Feder-Ram model using annual 
data for the US over the period 1952 to 1988. They did not find any relationship 
between defense and growth; Institute of Economic Forecasting
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x  Adams, Behrman and Boldin (1991) used a three sector model (defense, 
nondefense and export) with cross section and time series data for a group of less 
developed countries over the period 1974 to 1986. They found defense spending 
has no effect on growth, and exports have a positive effect; 
x  Huang and Mintz (1991) analyzed the impact by separating the defense effect into 
productivity and externality effects; they found no relationship; 
x  Gerace (2002) used a spectral analysis type methodology to investigate 
movements in US military expenditure, US non-military expenditure and US GDP. 
He found evidence that non-military expenditure is used as a counter-cyclical 
stabilization tool, but that military expenditure is not; 
x  Aizenman, Glick (2006), using data for 90 countries, analyzed the effect the ratio 
of military spending to GDP on economic growth. The estimated coefficient is 
negative but highly insignificant; adding the threat measure as an explanatory 
variable, increases the magnitude of the coefficient on military spending, but it is 
still not significant at conventional levels. The coefficient of threat, though very 
significant, is positive, implying that external conflicts have a positive effect on 
growth, contrary to their expectation; 
x  Habibullah, Law, Dayang-Afizzah (2008) examined the relationship between 
military expenditure and economic growth in selected Asian countries for the 
period 1989 to 2004. Empirical results showed that defense spending and 
economic growth in the Asian countries in the period under study are not related.
In the following part of the paper, we analyze Romania’s defense expenditure in a 
broader context, by comparing it with the other member countries of NATO and EU. 
The correlation between defense expenditures and economic growth is measured by 
a regression using average values for the period 1990-2007. We use cluster 
technique for the average values of defense expenditures and economic growth in 
order to determine if there is a common pattern for countries considered in the 
database. For Romania in the period 1990-2007 I perform cluster and regression 
analysis, Granger causality to test the existence and the sign of the correlation 
between defense expenditures and economic growth. 
The following table contains defense expenditures, in nominal values: 
Table 1
Defense expenditure (in constant 2005 US$ mil) - NATO and EU members 
1998-2007      1998-2007
Country 2007 mean  Stdev  CV  Country 2007  Mean  Stdev  CV
Austria 3,168 2,758 211 7.63% Luxembourg [319] 223 36 16.37%
Belgium 4,398 4,499 213 4.73% Malta 38.4 39 2 5.13%
Bulgaria 631 602 57 9.48% Netherlands 9,853 9,495 287 3.03%
Cyprus 
239
(2006) 280 71 25.41% Poland 6,973 5,694 702 12.32%
Czech
Rep 2,144 2,150 169 7.87% Portugal [3,343] 3,507 189 5.40%
Denmark 3,666 3,662 99 2.69% Romania 2,303 1,845 224 12.12%
Estonia 329 186 74 39.69% Slovakia 925 776 80 10.26% The Impact of Defense Expenditure on Economic Growth 
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1998-2007      1998-2007
Country 2007 mean  Stdev  CV  Country 2007  Mean  Stdev  CV
Finland 2,677 2,450 268 10.95% Slovenia 602 465 90 19.27%
France 53,579 51,881 1,542 2.97% Spain 14,628 11,828 1,349 11.41%
Germany 36,929 39,602 1,746 4.41% Sweden 5,272 5,784 363 6.28%
Greece [9,346] 8,336 309 3.71%
United
Kingdom 59,705 53,922 5,798 10.75%
Hungary 1,255 1,495 182 12.14%
Ireland 1,152 1,150 31 2.70% Canada 15,155 12,377 1,231 9.94%
Italy 33,086 33,349 1,314 3.94% Norway 4,920 4,789 337 7.04%
Latvia 390 198 115 58.03% Turkey 11,066 13,118 2,252 17.17%
Lithuania 372 318 36 11.35%
United
States 546,786 421,503 84,801 20.12%
Convention: US$ m. = Million US dollars; . . = Data not available or not applicable, ( ) = 
= Uncertain figure, [ ] = SIPRI estimate. 
Source: SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), 
http://www.sipri.org/contents/webmaster/databases.
Average value of defense expenditure in Romania represents 3.4% of the maximum, 
4706% of the minimum and 25% of the EU average. But this measure of defense 
expenditures does not permit an international comparison, because of the differences 
in countries’ dimensions and characteristics. 
In order to investigate the correlation between defense and economic growth, I use 
the following indicators: 
x  the real rate of gross domestic product growth (GDP growth rate) for economic 
growth
x  the ratio of defense expenditure to the gross domestic product (also called 
defense burden) 
The next table contains these two variables – values for 2007, mean values and 
standard deviations for the period 1990-2007 and for the last ten years. 
Table 2
Ratio of defense expenditure to GDP and real rate of GDP growth (in %) - 
NATO and EU members 
2007 1990-2007 1998-200











Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev
Austria 3.40 0.95 2.44 1.15 1.01 0.10 2.40 1.12 0.93 0.06
Belgium 2.80 1.11 2.11 1.24 1.49 0.34 2.21 1.11 1.26 0.13
Bulgaria 6.20 2.00 0.78 5.95 2.56 0.44 5.06 1.36 2.43 0.21
Cyprus  4.04 1.35 4.11 2.28 2.82 1.45 3.95 1.11 1.88 0.67
Czech Rep  5.65 1.58 2.02 4.28 1.94 0.21 3.50 2.30 1.90 0.15
Denmark 1.80 1.36 2.18 1.38 1.64 0.20 2.00 1.15 1.49 0.10
Estonia 7.11 1.88 2.70 8.52 1.30 0.40 7.22 3.02 1.56 0.24
Finland 4.40 1.24 2.40 3.26 1.48 0.22 3.66 1.38 1.32 0.10
France 2.20 2.37 1.94 1.11 2.83 0.37 2.31 0.99 2.53 0.11
Germany  2.50 1.28 1.94 1.59 1.62 0.32 1.57 1.14 1.42 0.08Institute of Economic Forecasting
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2007 1990-2007 1998-200











Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev
Greece 4.00 3.02 2.98 1.77 3.34 0.32 4.13 0.53 3.27 0.41
Hungary  1.30 1.10 1.79 4.32 1.77 0.44 4.10 1.07 1.51 0.22
Ireland 5.30 0.54 6.52 2.80 0.87 0.26 6.56 2.20 0.66 0.10
Italy  1.50 1.79 1.38 1.07 1.94 0.09 1.38 1.06 1.94 0.08
Latvia 10.31 1.82 1.97 10.82 1.17 0.48 7.99 2.50 1.37 0.47
Lithuania 8.78 1.16 1.60 9.37 0.98 0.41 6.51 3.31 1.24 0.18
Luxembourg 4.50 0.77 4.56 2.41 0.75 0.06 4.94 2.39 0.76 0.06
Malta 3.40 0.70 3.75 2.39 0.83 0.14 2.37 2.47 0.71 0.05
Netherlands 3.50 1.48 2.67 1.35 1.82 0.34 2.47 1.57 1.57 0.07
Poland 6.52 2.00 3.94 3.32 2.15 0.25 4.21 1.77 2.00 0.06
Portugal 1.90 1.76 2.23 1.98 2.14 0.22 1.97 1.74 1.97 0.08
Romania 6.18 1.83 1.21 6.29 2.80 0.89 3.85 4.10 2.28 0.38
Slovakia 10.37 1.66 2.56 6.24 1.98 0.49 4.80 3.35 1.73 0.10
Slovenia 6.07 1.51 2.88 3.96 1.53 0.25 4.30 1.10 1.41 0.13
Spain 3.80 1.19 3.10 1.42 1.32 0.20 3.81 0.75 1.16 0.06
Sweden  2.60 1.35 2.19 2.03 2.02 0.38 3.11 1.23 1.74 0.25
United
Kingdom 3.00 2.58 2.39 1.35 2.94 0.54 2.82 0.59 2.57 0.11
Canada 2.70 1.34 2.66 1.86 1.41 0.30 3.31 1.28 1.19 0.07
Norway  3.50 1.45 3.14 1.24 2.16 0.48 2.54 0.90 1.83 0.27
Turkey  4.45 2.07 4.52 4.75 2.89 0.56 4.06 4.96 2.99 0.74
United States 2.20 4.19 2.90 1.30 3.89 0.66 2.95 1.20 3.59 0.47
Max  10.37 4.19 6.52 10.82 3.89 1.45 7.99 4.96 3.59 0.74
Min 1.30 0.54 0.78 1.07 0.75 0.06 1.38 0.53 0.66 0.05
Average 4.39 1.63 2.70 3.32 1.92 0.38 3.74 1.77 1.75 0.20
Data source: The World Bank. 
In 1997, countries that obtain a greater rate of GDP growth than the average are (in 
ascending order): Finland, Turkey, Luxembourg, Ireland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia. Countries 
that obtain a greater rate of defense expenditures on GDP than the average are: 
Slovakia, Portugal, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Estonia, Poland, Bulgaria, Turkey, France, 
the United Kingdom, Greece, the United States. 
For the period 1990-2007 countries that obtain a greater rate of GDP growth than the 
average are: Slovenia, the United States, Greece, Spain, Norway, Malta, Poland, 
Cyprus, Turkey, Luxembourg, Ireland. Countries that obtain a greater rate of defense 
expenditures on GDP than the average are: Italy, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Sweden, Portugal, Poland, Norway, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus, France, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, Greece, the United States. 
For the period 1998-2007 countries that obtain a greater rate of GDP growth than the 
average are: Spain, Romania, Cyprus, Turkey, Hungary, Greece, Poland, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Ireland, Estonia, Latvia. Countries that 
obtain a greater rate of defense expenditures on GDP than the average are: Norway, 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, France, the 
United Kingdom, Turkey, Greece, the United States.  The Impact of Defense Expenditure on Economic Growth 
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Regarding the values of standard deviation, we can say that the more volatile values 
are for the following countries (for the period 1990-2007): 
x  Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, Slovakia, 
Romania, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia (standard deviation of GDP growth rate). 
x  Sweden, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Norway, Slovakia, the 
United Kingdom, Turkey, the United States, Romania, Cyprus (standard deviation 
of defense expenditures/GDP). 
Regarding the values of standard deviation, we can say that the more volatile values 
are for the following countries (for the period 1998-2007): 
x  Poland, Ireland, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Malta, Latvia, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Turkey (standard deviation of GDP growth rate). 
x  Bulgaria, Hungary, Estonia, Sweden, Norway, Romania, Greece, the United 
States, Latvia, Cyprus, Turkey (standard deviation of defense expenditures/GDP). 
In order to determine whether there is a relation between defense expenditures and 
economic growth in the selected countries, the next two figures express the GDP 
growth rate and defense expenditure/GDP, using average values for the period 1990-
2007 and for the period 1998-2007.
Figure 1 
GDP growth rate and defense expenditures/GDP  
– mean values (1990-2007) for NATO and EU members
The relationship between defense expenditure and economic growth, using mean 
values, appears to be negative – countries that have greater defense/GDP obtain 
lower GDP growth rate. This might be interpreted as a support of the theory “guns or 
butter”, sustained by the arguments: the crowding-out effect on private investment, the 
opportunity cost of defense spending, the increased taxation in order to finance 
defense expenditures, the impact on the efficiency of resource allocation, the increase 
of the political power of the military. Institute of Economic Forecasting
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Figure 2 
GDP growth rate and defense expenditures/GDP  
– mean values (1998-2007) for NATO and EU members
Data source: The World Bank. 
In order to investigate the relationship between defense expenditures and economic 
growth, I perform a pooled least squares regression, using data from 1990-2007, for 
32 countries. The coefficient of defense expenditures is negative, indicating a negative 
correlation between defense expenditure and economic growth for the case of the 32 
countries for 18 years, but the regression has a low R squared, so that the defense 
expenditures explain a very small part of the variation of GDP real growth rate.
Table 3 
Pooled Least Squares – Economic growth and defense expenditures 
Dependent Variable: GDPGROWTH
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Sample: 1 558 
GDPGROWTH=C(1)+C(2)*DEFENSE_EXPENDITURES 
 Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C(1) 4.152742  0.354083  11.72814  0.0000 
C(2) -0.590769  0.166639  -3.545214  0.0004 
For the case of Romania, I analyze the possible correlation between defense 
expenditures and economic growth – the following figure represents the values of 
defense expenditures, as ratio on GDP, and economic growth, as GDP real rate of 
growth. The Impact of Defense Expenditure on Economic Growth 
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Figure 3 



















































































































Data source: World Bank 
In order to obtain the sign of a possible relation, I use the quintile technique: I split the 
values (in total, 18 data) into three intervals, depending of the level of each variable.
Table 4 
 Quintile analysis for economic growth and defense expenditure 
Defense/GDP (Ö)
q1 Q2  Q3 
q1   1999 
1990,1991, 1992, 1997, 
1998
















2003, 2004, 2006, 
2007 1995,  2001   
Using quantile techniques, it is obvious that in years with high rate of economic growth 
the defense expenditures have low values, and vice versa; again, the conclusion is 
that the relation between defense expenditure and economic growth is indirect. 
Applying ordinary least squares technique, expressing economic growth as a function 
of defense expenditures, I obtain a negative coefficient of the ratio of defense 
expenditures to GDP. 
The results might be carefully interpreted – there are objections to applying regression 
for explaining the impact of defense expenditure on economic growth
9; this method 
implies exogeneity of the independent variable, defense expenditure; it might be the 
case that defense expenditure is determined by economic development, at least 
through the budgetary restriction – in the recession period, the limited resources are 
used first for other programs. It might be the case that this specific expenditure is the 
most sensitive to the budgetary constraint changes, thus its value is not exogenous. 
                                                          
9 Joerding, W. (1984) “Economic Growth and Defense Spending: Granger Causality”,  Journal of 
Development Economics.Institute of Economic Forecasting
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Figure 4 
Regression using annual values for Romania’s defense expenditures 
and economic growth 
Studying the correlation between defense expenditures and economic growth, we 
might obtain one of four possible causality relationships: unidirectional causality from 
defense expenditures, unidirectional causality from economic growth, bi-directional 
causality, no causality. 
I test how much of the current level of economic growth may be explained by past 
values of defense expenditures. Economic growth is Granger-caused by defense 
expenditures if values of defense expenditures help in the prediction of economic 
growth. The results of the Granger causality tests are presented in the following table: 
Table 5 
 Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Null Hypothesis:  F-Statistic  Probability 
ROM_GROWTH does not Granger Cause ROM_DEFENSE 1.48245  0.26912 
ROM_DEFENSE does not Granger Cause ROM_GROWTH 0.89793  0.43529 
These results show that the hypothesis that economic growth does not Granger cause 
defense expenditures cannot be rejected and neither the hypothesis that defense 
expenditures do not Granger cause economic growth. 
The impact of defense expenditure on economic growth might be dependent on the 
composition of expenditure. SIPRI considers that military expenditures include all 
current and capital expenditure on: the armed forces, including peace keeping forces; 
defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; 
paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped and available for military 
operations; and military space activities. Such expenditures should include: personnel 
- all expenditures on current personnel, military and civil, retirement pensions of 
military personnel and social services for personnel and their families; operations and  The Impact of Defense Expenditure on Economic Growth 
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maintenance; procurement; military research and development; military construction; 
and military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country). 
NATO categorizes defense expenditures into four: personnel expenditures, equipment 
expenditures, infrastructure expenditures and other operational expenditures.
Budgetary economic classification of expenditures, categorizes expenditures into 
three: current expenditures (which contain personnel expenditures, goods and 
services, interest, transfers and subventions, social assistance and other 
expenditures), capital expenditures and financial operation. 
In this context, for a positive effect on economic growth, the structure of defense 
expenditure might be in favor of productive expenditures. Expenditures on 
infrastructure may contribute to development, especially in developing countries, 
because infrastructure services built for military purposes can also be used for civilian 
purposes, thus promoting economic growth. As a potential cause of negative effect on 
economic growth is the spending on equipment and other operational spending.
Table 6
Defense expenditures in Romania 
(thou.RON)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES  6.070.017 6.381.481 7.638.446 8.342.796  7.651.916
Personal 1.552.913 2.116.715 2.830.238 3.126.952  3.071.493
Goods and services  1.708.499 1.321.264 1.371.479 1.319.993  977.961 
Interest  62.143 39.968 30.998 23.912  0 
Subventions 44.168  18.500  15.798  18.352  15.599 
Transfers  935.436 147.741 175.682 235.217 355.301 
Social assistance  0  1.213.690 1.534.078 1.828.267  2.045.277
Other 0  0  4.414  2.500  1.420 
Capital 1.355.117 1.241.711 1.455.191 1.610.291  1.184.865
Loan  repayments  411.742 281.892 220.568 177.312  0 
Data source: Ministry of Finance. 
Figure 5 
The structure of defense expenditures in Romania Institute of Economic Forecasting
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Data source: Ministry of Finance. 
Romania’s budget for defense reflects a structure of defense expenditures defined by 
the following hierarchy: personnel expenditures (with an upward trend), social 
assistance (with an upward trend), capital expenditures (with a downward trend), 
goods and services (with a downward trend). This might be the explanation for the 
negative correlation between defense expenditures and economic growth. 
This study of the impact of defense expenditure on economic growth has a major limit: 
we apply simple econometric methods to a very complex process. A further analysis 
might consider to apply nonparametric linear programming techniques such as Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
10 in order to measure the efficiency of defense 
expenditure. We limit our current analysis because of the restriction regarding tha data 
required (qualitative and quantitative information for the defense department). The 
results of the DEA analysis might explain the efficiency or inefficiency of the resource 
allocation.
                                                          
10 For further details, see Coelli, T.J. (1996), “A Guide to DEAP Version 2.1: A Data 
Envelopment Analysis (Computer) Program”, Centre for Efficiency and Productivity Analysis 
(CEPA) Working Papers, The University of New England.  The Impact of Defense Expenditure on Economic Growth 
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4. Conclusions 
The correlation between defense expenditure and economic growth might be 
interpreted in the context of resources of financing - defense expenditure, as a 
productive category of public expenditure, if financed by non-distorting revenues, has 
a positive effect on economic growth; if financed by distorting revenues, it might have 
a positive or negative effect on economic growth, depending on the level of the 
defense expenditure.
Arguments sustaining a positive correlation are referring to the effects of research and 
development in the defense sector, security, demand – Keynesian effect, labor and 
investment in the defense sector. Arguments sustaining a negative correlation are 
referring to the effects of crowding out private investment, opportunity cost of the 
resources used in defense sector, increased taxation for financing defense 
expenditures, inefficiency of resource allocation, increased political power of the 
military.
In this paper I analyze the effect of defense expenditure on economic growth in 
Romania, using the variables: real growth rate of GDP and ratio of defense 
expenditures to GDP. The regression expressing economic growth as a function of 
defense expenditures generate negative coefficient, which indicates that the two 
variables are negatively correlated.
The results might be carefully interpreted; the regression method implies exogeneity 
of the independent variable, defense expenditure; it might be the case that defense 
expenditure is determined by economic development, at least through the budgetary 
restriction – in the recession period, the limited resources are used first for other 
programs. It might be the case that this specific expenditure is the most sensitive to 
the budgetary constraint changes, thus its value is not exogenous. The Granger-
causality test concludes that the hypothesis that economic growth does not Granger-
cause defense expenditure and vice versa cannot be rejected. 
The impact of defense expenditure on economic growth might be dependent on the 
composition of expenditure. For a positive effect on economic growth, the structure of 
defense expenditure might be in favor of productive expenditures. A potential cause of 
negative effect on economic growth in Romania is the high proportion of the spending 
on equipment and other operational spending.
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